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Abstract
I investigate the link between economic fundamentals and exchange
rate adjustment to commodity price fluctuations. I overcome the tra-
ditional issue of simultaneity by exploiting the September 14, 2019
drone attack on two Saudi Arabian refineries as a natural experiment.
This unanticipated event caused the largest 1-day global crude oil
price spike in over a decade. Using high-frequency exchange rate data
for 30 countries, I measure each currency’s return around the event
window, and link currency return heterogeneity to country-level eco-
nomic and monetary fundamentals. Crude export and import inten-
sities were associated with appreciation (depreciation). In addition,
countries with current account surpluses, as opposed to deficits, and
greater international reserves saw more currency appreciation, thereby
buffering the depreciating effects on crude oil importers. Countries
with higher policy interest rates, consisting of mostly Emerging Mar-
ket economies, experienced greater depreciation conditional on crude
oil export/import exposure.
∗University of Southern California, Economics Department, rashadah@usc.edu
1 Introduction
The complex relationship between commodity prices and exchange rates is
of great interest to international economists and policymakers, especially for
those focusing on resource-dependent open economies [See Edwards (1986)[6],
Chen and Rogoff (2003)[4], Cashin et al. (2004)[3], Aizenman et al. (2012)[2].].
Despite the rich literature on exchange rate adjustment to commodity shocks,
establishing causality under this context remains challenging because of si-
multaneity: it’s possible that exchange rates fluctuations cause commodity
prices to adjust [Chen et al. (2010)[5]] or for commodity fluctuations to im-
pact exchange rates under the assumption that open economies are price tak-
ers in the world commodity market1. Several studies report evidence of pre-
dictability or cointegration [Chen et al. (2010)[5], Lee and Chen (2014)[10],
Kohlscheen et al. (2017)[9], among others.], oft considered the second-best
approach when causal identification can’t be achieved.
This paper takes an alternative approach to identify the causal effect
of commodity prices on exchange rates. I exploit the September 14, 2019
surprise attack on two Saudi Arabian oil refineries as a natural experiment,
where this completely unanticipated shock to global crude oil supplies sent
world crude prices sharply higher, leading to the largest 1-day spike in over
a decade. Using high-frequency data on exchange rates across 30 countries, I
measure exchange rate adjustment around the window of the unanticipated
oil shock and link the heterogeneity in exchange rate adjustment back to
various country-specific fundamentals. Consistent with the literature, I find
that both a country’s trade-related oil exposure and financial/monetary con-
ditions jointly explain exchange rate adjustment to the oil shock. Heavier
crude exporters (importers) saw greater appreciation (depreciation). Current
account surpluses (as opposed to deficits) and greater international reserves
are associated with appreciation, thereby buffering depreciation effects on
crude oil importers. Countries with higher policy interest rates, usually ob-
served among Emerging Market economies, saw greater depreciation for any
given level of crude oil exposure. At least in the very short-run, this evi-
dence of exchange rate adjustment goes against the conventional view that
exchange rates are un-responsive to commodity supply shocks [Basher et al.
(2015)[12] and Habib et al. (2016)[8]].
1As done in several of the mentioned papers. A reasonable assumption though with ex-
ceptions: Russia as an oil exporter, OPEC countries as a coordinating organization, China
as an importer of copper, Chile as an exporter of copper, United States corn production.
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Figure 1: September 14, 2019 Drone Attacks
Source: VOAnews.com
2 September 14, 2019 Oil Supply Shock
2.1 Crude Oil Prices
In Saudi Arabia on September 14, 2019, drones were used in a surprise at-
tack on two of the largest Saudi Aramco oil refineries - state-owned facilities:
Abqaiq and Khurais in Eastern Saudi Arabia (Figure 1). According to the
Saudi Arabian interior ministry, the flames induced by the attack were put
out relatively quickly, but both facilities were shut down for repairs, tem-
porarily cutting the country’s oil production (about 5 percent of global pro-
duction) by about half. Despite the country communicating that it will tap
into its oil reserves to buffer the supply shock, the news led the the sharpest
one-day rise in global crude oil prices in over a decade.
Figure 2 shows that as the futures market opened on the subsequent
Sunday evening, crude oil futures prices jumped over 10 percent from roughly
$55 per barrel to $61, and then continued to rise through Monday to a peak of
over $63. While the attack happened while markets were closed, the opening
gap largely represents the market response to the news, as no other news over
the weekend was release that would have such a profoundly distinct impact
on crude oil prices.
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Figure 2: Intra-day WTI Crude Oil Futures Re-
sponse to 9/14 Drone Attack
2.2 Exchange Rate Adjustment
Meanwhile, as foreign exchange markets around the world opened, currency
responses varied. Naturally, those countries which do not have oil-intensive
dependencies continued to operate as ’business as usual’. In contrast, ex-
change rates of Russia, Norway, and Canada - major oil exporters - saw
sudden appreciation. Other countries observed marked depreciation, includ-
ing Turkey and South Africa. These countries tend to be oil importers, and
also financially fragile. Figure 3 reports visually the heterogeneity observed
in exchange rate responses before and after news of the oil supply shock. Fig-
ure 5 breaks down the exchange rate responses by country upon market open.
What determined the varying exchange rate responses to the oil shock?
Visually, it appears that crude oil dependency is a relevant factor determining
whether the exchange rate experienced meaningful adjustment. But as the
theoretical literature suggests, there are other interactions which could am-
plify otherwise limited commodity exposure, such as a country’s net financial
position, credit worthiness, monetary regime, etc.
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Figure 3: Intra-day Exchange Rate Response to
9/14 Drone Attack
15-minute frequency data. All currencies vis-a-vis
the USD. Positive change is appreciation against
the USD.
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3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Data
For a sample of 30 countries, I collect intra-day exchange rate data at the
30-minute frequency around the weekend of the Saudi refinery strike from
Bloomberg. The sample contains 12 developed market currencies (includ-
ing the G10 less United States), and 18 emerging market currencies. All
exchange rates are vis-a-vis the USD, and a positive change implies appreci-
ation against the U.S. Dollar.
I also compile a cross-sectional data set on country-specific trade and fi-
nancial fundamentals from various public sources: UN COMTRADE, IMF,
World Bank, and the CIA World Factbook. The most recent data is taken,
mostly from 2018/2019, but on some occasions the statics are dated from
2017. Tables 2 and 3 report sample mean and standard deviations respec-
tively, across all countries and for Developed Market Economies (DMEs) and
Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) subgroups. China is by far, the largest
country in the sample by GDP (over $12 trillion), which pulls up the aver-
age GDP of EMEs to be comparable to DMEs, though EME GDP is nearly
twice as volatile. While most crude oil / refined petrol trade variables are bal-
anced across countries, DMEs import considerably more refined petroleum
than EMEs. EMEs also tend to have lower current count surpluses than
DMEs, on average, along with larger external debt/GDP and lower public
debt/GDP and international reserves/GDP. Policy interest rates are much
higher and more varied among EMEs than DMEs. Many DMEs have rates
pinned near the effective lower bound, explaining both their lower average
level and standard deviation.
3.2 High-Frequency Identification
Truly exogenous macroeconomic shocks are rare. Therefore, the unantici-
pated attack on Saudi oil refinery’s makes for a valuable case study because
the direction of causality between commodity prices and exchange rates is
unambiguous. Moreover, an isolated shock to a specific commodity - crude
oil - provides valuable cross-sectional heterogeneity in exchange rates, which
I aim to link back to the variation in fundamentals across countries. High-
frequency event studies are ubiquitous in the macro-finance literature (See
Gurkaynak and Wright (2013)[7] for a survey. Aizenman et al. (2016)[1] and
Neely (2015)[11] specifically look at exchange rate responses to monetary pol-
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icy in an event study framework). The key identification assumption is that
within the window of the event, no other news or fundamental changes occur
which would impact the exchange rate. Because we are analyzing a narrow
window of exchange rate responses, the assumption is reasonably satisfied.
Moreover, the fact that many non-exposed currencies saw no discernible ef-
fect is supportive of little to no other market-moving macroeconomic news
announcements over the event period.
Cross-country fundamentals are taken as fixed over the event window.
Because country fundamentals tend to evolve slowly, and almost certainly
do not rapidly vary from day-to-day, the assumption of fundamentals being
exogenous over the event window is very likely to hold. Moreover, since the
data on fundamentals updates with a lag, using data from 2017-2019 up until
the event also ensures against any potential endogeneity.
3.3 Regression Analysis
Let the percent change in the exchange rate vis-a-vis the USD (where positive
change implies local appreciation against the USD) be denoted as:
∆ei,ab =
Ei,a − Ei,b
Ei,b
, (1)
where ∆ei,ab is the exchange rate percent return of country i from period
b (before event) to period a (after event). Ei,a and Ei,b are the corresponding
nominal exchange rate levels, before and after the event. For each coun-
try, the before-period corresponds to the exchange rate recorded at the close
of 9/13. Most recorded closing values are from 16:30:00 EST, though clos-
ing times vary across FX markets2. Post-event exchange rates are mostly
recorded on 9/15 20:00:003. The constructed returns capture the percent
change in exchange rates over the period of the oil shock.
The following regression specification tests the effect of fundamentals on
exchange rate adjustment to the oil price shock:
∆ei,ab = α + β
′Xi + ei, (2)
where [OXi, OIi, RXi, RIi, CAi, EDi, PDi, IRi, ri] ∈ Xi and OXi and
OIi are crude oil exports/GDP and crude oil imports/GDP, respectively.
2For Peru and Malaysia values are taken from 14:30:00 and 11:30:00 EST, respectively.
3With the exception of: India (9/15 20:30:00), Malaysia, Sweden, Hungary, and Colom-
bia (all of which have new prints by 9/16 05:00:00).
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RXi and RIi are refined petroleum exports and imports (normalized by
GDP). CAi is the current account surplus/GDP. EDi and PDi are exter-
nal debt/GDP and public debt/GDP, respectively. IRi are international
reserves/GDP, and ri is the nominal policy interest rate of the country. The
intercept term, α, captures the average change vis-a-vis the USD across all
exchange rates, or ∆e¯ab. Because the average exchange rate return is statis-
tically indifferent from zero, I restrict the regression intercept to equal zero
to preserve degrees of freedom4.
Table 1: Cross-section correlation, FX returns over
event window and economic fundamentals
OXi OIi RXi RIi CAi EDi PDi IRi ri
∆ei,ab 0.58 -0.37 -0.05 -0.14 0.15 0.12 0.18 0.15 -0.34
Table 1 reports sample cross-section correlations between exchange rate
returns over the event period and different economic variables. Unsurpris-
ingly, heavier exporters and importers of crude oil appreciated and depre-
ciated on average following the supply shock. More intriguingly, exposure
to refined petroleum trade is considerably weaker, and countries with higher
interest rates also experienced depreciation, suggesting a role for financial
fragility.
4 Results
The regression results are reported in Table 4. Interesting interactions be-
tween a country’s crude oil exposure and financial condition emerge. Refined
petroleum exports and imports are not significant upon including crude oil
imports and exports. Crude oil exporters and importers react to the oil
shocks as expected, by appreciating and depreciating, respectively. Though
the cumulative exchange rate change may have been economically small (Fig-
ure 3), this evidence of reacting to a supply shock goes against the conven-
tional view that exchange rates do not react to supply shocks - at least in
the very short run5. The first few columns of the results highlight a potential
asymmetry, where importers’ exchange rates were doubly sensitive to the oil
shock compared to exporters. The asymmetry disappears in column 5 upon
including policy interest rates which itself has significant explanatory power
4∆e¯ab is equal to -0.0007, t-stat of -1.13.
5Habib et al. (2016)[8], Basher et al. (2015)[12].
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over exchange rate responses. Column 5 implies that a country with exports
(imports)/GDP of 0.05, or 5%, would have appreciated (depreciated) by an
expected +0.48% (-0.64%) in response to the oil shock6. Conditional on ex-
posure to crude oil, countries with higher policy rates, composed mostly of
EMEs, saw their exchange rates depreciate more. Similarly, countries with
current account deficits saw their exchange rates depreciate relative to those
with surpluses, but this effect becomes insignificant after jointly including IR
and policy rates. Crude importers will higher IR and lower policy rates saw
their currencies buffered, depreciating less. Conversely, crude exporters with
higher IR and lower rates saw their exchange rates appreciate more. Debt
variables are insignificant, and the full specification can explain 62 percent of
the cross-sectional variation in exchange rate responses around the oil shock,
half of which (about 30%) is attributed to the country’s crude oil exposure.
Overall the results are consistent with the view that exchange rates adjust
to oil shocks via both the trade channel and financial channels7.
A limitation of this study is that it is considering a single, specific event.
Moreover, high-frequency identification comes at the cost of only obtaining
short-run effect estimates. We cannot extend these short-run claims to the
long-run. Despite this limitation, most studies on commodity currencies
focus on the longer run, thus this approach provides a novel view of the
phenomena.
5 Conclusion
Exchange rate adjustment to commodity price fluctuations is an important
topic to understand for economists and policymakers, yet causal inference
remains challenging. To overcome the issue of simultaneity, I exploit the
September 14, 2019 drone attack on two Saudi Arabian refineries as a natu-
ral experiment. This unanticipated event caused the largest 1-day crude oil
price spike in over a decade. Using high-frequency exchange rate data for 30
countries, I measure currency returns around the oil shock, and link cross-
country heterogeneity to country-specific trade and monetary fundamentals.
Trade exposure through exports and imports of crude oil, international re-
serves holdings, policy interest rates, and current account position together
explain over half of the cross-country variation in exchange rate adjustment
to the oil price shock.
6Russia and Norway have greater than 6% exports/GDP. Singapore and Taiwan have
greater than 6% imports/GDP.
7Aizenman et al (2012)[2] and Lee and Chen (2014)[10].
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6 Appendix
Table 2: Economic Fundamentals, Sample Mean
Sample Mean All DMEs EMEs
GDP 1454.1000 1433.0000 1468.1667
Exports 342.5167 363.6083 328.4556
Imports 289.2667 336.2917 257.9167
Oil Exported 9.0135 8.8872 9.0977
Refined Exported 10.2014 10.4762 10.0182
Oil Imported 17.4621 16.2467 18.2724
Refined Imported 9.1934 12.4512 7.0215
Crude/GDP -0.0042 -0.0069 -0.0024
Crude/Trade 0.0002 -0.0033 0.0025
Trade Openness 0.6326 0.6440 0.6250
Current Account/GDP 0.0194 0.0481 0.0002
External Debt/GDP 1.0050 1.7775 0.4900
Public Debt/GDP 0.5814 0.7501 0.4689
Int’l Reserves/GDP 0.2755 0.3234 0.2435
Policy Rate 0.0306 0.0069 0.0464
N 30 12 18
Values (first 7 rows) in USD ($ Billions). Data
taken from various public sources: UN COM-
TRADE, IMF IFS, CIA World Factbook and
World Bank. All Statistics are from 2018/2019 or
latest available date.
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Figure 4: Regression Results
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Table 3: Economic Fundamentals, Sample Stan-
dard Deviation
Sample Standard Deviation All DMEs EMEs
GDP 2318.0396 1521.1746 2769.1932
Exports 466.3483 352.5479 538.5630
Imports 324.2887 302.0441 343.1659
Oil Exported 20.2255 16.7850 22.7048
Refined Exported 14.2736 12.0371 15.9282
Oil Imported 30.7564 17.4262 37.6225
Refined Imported 9.4871 12.0207 6.8958
Crude GDP 0.0310 0.0347 0.0292
Crude Trade 0.0701 0.0583 0.0785
Trade Openness 0.4371 0.4526 0.4395
Current Account/GDP 0.0590 0.0718 0.0404
External Debt/GDP 0.9814 1.1615 0.2608
Public Debt/GDP 0.4074 0.5774 0.1839
Int’l Reserves/GDP 0.2664 0.3922 0.1373
Policy Rate 0.0346 0.0083 0.0366
N 30 12 18
Values (first 7 rows) in USD ($ Billions). Data
taken from various public sources: UN COM-
TRADE, IMF IFS, CIA World Factbook and
World Bank. All Statistics are from 2018/2019 or
latest available date.
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Table 4: Country List
Country EME/DME FX
1 Argentina EME ARSUSD
2 Australia DME AUDUSD
3 Brazil EME BRLUSD
4 Canada DME CADUSD
5 Chile EME CLPUSD
6 China EME CNHUSD
7 Colombia EME COPUSD
8 Czech EME CZKUSD
9 Denmark DME DKKUSD
10 Euro DME EURUSD
11 Hungary EME HUFUSD
12 India EME INRUSD
13 Indonesia EME IDRUSD
14 Japan DME JPYUSD
15 Malaysia EME MYRUSD
16 Mexico EME MXNUSD
17 New Zealand DME NZDUSD
18 Norway DME NOKUSD
19 Peru EME PENUSD
20 Poland EME PLNUSD
21 Russia EME RUBUSD
22 S. Korea EME KRWUSD
23 Singapore DME SGDUSD
24 South Africa EME ZARUSD
25 Sweden DME SEKUSD
26 Switzerland DME CHFUSD
27 Taiwan DME TWDUSD
28 Thailand EME THBUSD
29 Turkey EME TRYUSD
30 United Kingdom DME GBPUSD
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Figure 5: Intra-day Exchange Rate Response to
9/14 Drone Attack
Percent change in exchange rate from 9/13 close
to 9/15 open. All currencies vis-a-vis the USD.
Positive change is appreciation against the USD.
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